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I. Introduction1 
The debate surrounding the extraterritorial scope of  EU data protection law is 
not new.2 After a period of  raising limited concern and passing largely unnoticed, the 
discussion was fueled, first, by the Google Spain ruling.3 In this case, the Court of  Justice 
of  the European Union (CJEU) found that EU data protection law applies to the 
activities of  Google Inc. established overseas. Secondly, the provisions on the territorial 
scope of  EU data protection law have gained more attention with the adoption of  the 
EU GDPR.4
There are several aspects of  the current debate: first, the question surrounding 
the legitimacy of  the extraterritorial scope of  the GDPR and the demand for the 
EU to exercise jurisdictional restraint5; secondly, there are authors who welcome 
GDPR’s new criteria as “revolutionary game changers” and emphasize the need to ensure 
effective protection6; and, lastly, there are those that stress the difficulties concerning 
the enforceability of  the EU’s jurisdictional claim.7
This article aims to introduce a new element to this discussion highlighting a 
problem identified in different official versions of  the GDPR regarding its territorial 
scope. After a short description of  the previous territorial scope (1) under Directive 
95/46/EC8, this paper will then (2) underline the new rules set on the GDPR9; look 
at the criteria established in Article 3(2) of  the English version of  the GDPR and 
compare them (3) with the rules outlined in the same Article in other official versions 
of  the GDPR; I will then (4) demonstrate the practical consequences of  the linguistic 
1 This article was written with the financial support of  “Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia” 
(“FCT”). I must thank Francisco Pereira Coutinho and Gabriela Zanfir for the brief  but important 
exchange of  ideas regarding the subject of  this article.
2 Yves Poullet, “Transborder Data Flows and Extraterritoriality: the European Position”, Journal of  
International Commercial Law and Technology 2 (2007): 141; Joshua Bauchner, “State Sovereignty and the 
Globalizing Effects of  the Internet: A Case Study of  the Privacy Debate”, BJIL 26 (2000-2001): 696; 
Lee Bygrave, “Determining Applicable law pursuant to European Data Protection Legislation”, CLSR 
16 (2000): 252; Lokke Moerel, “Back to basics: when does EU data protection law apply?”, IDPL 1(2) 
(2011): 97; and “The long arm reach of  EU data protection law: Does the Data Protection Directive 
apply to processing of  personal data of  EU citizens by websites worldwide?”, IDPL 1(1) (2011): 
30; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Working document on determining the international 
application of  EU data protection law to personal data processing on the Internet by non-EU based 
web sites”, 30 may, 2002.
3 Judgment Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario 
Costeja González, Case C-131/12, May 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
4 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  27 April 2016 on 
the protection of  natural persons with regard to the processing of  personal data and on the free 
movement of  such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
5 Merlin Gomann, “The new territorial scope of  EU Data Protection Law: Deconstructing a Revolutionary 
Achievement”, Common Market Law Review 54 (2017): 567; Brendan Van Alsenoy, “Reconciling the 
(extra) territorial reach of  the GDPR with public international law”, Data Protection and Privacy under 
Pressure, ed. Gert Vermeulen and Eva Lievens (Antwerp: Maklu Publishers, 2017), 77-98; Christopher 
Kuner, “Extraterritoriality and regulation of  international data transfers in EU data protection law”, 
International Data Privacy Law 5 (2015): 235.
6 Ulrich Dammann, “Erfolge und Defizite der EU-Datenschutzgrundverordnung”, Zeitschrift für 
Datenschutz (2016): 307.
7  Christopher Kuner, Extraterritoriality and regulation…, 244.
8 Directive 95/46/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  24 October 1995 on the 
protection of  individuals with regard to the processing of  personal data and the free movement of  
such data.
9 According to article 94 (1) GDPR, “Directive 95/46/EC is repealed with effect from 25 May 2018”. 
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ambivalence identified before, in the literature and in the Portuguese legislative proposal 
implementing the GDPR; and (5) the Author will explore the solution finally advanced 
by the Council of  the EU in May 2018.
II. The territorial scope of  EU data protection law under 
Directive 95/46/EC
The applicability of  EU data protection law was laid down in Article 4 of  the 
Directive 95/46/EC, namely the scope of  law both within and, for what is relevant for 
this paper, outside the EU. From the perspective of  transnational companies, Article 4 
was the most important provision in the Directive since it governed whether any of  
its rules applied to them in the first place. On the other side, it was also an important 
provision from the perspective of  the data subject as it established the terms and limits 
of  the protection afforded in EU data protection law. However, despite this relevance, 
several authors criticized this provision stating that it was “poorly constructed”10 and 
underlined the “difficulties in determining whether EU data protection law applies to processing of  
personal data in the new technical global environment”.11
In practice, Article 4 hinged on two main rules: one relating to data controllers 
established in the EU (1.1) and another for non-EU controllers (not established in the 
EU) (1.2.). 
a.  Data controllers established in the EU
According to Article 4(1)(a), the Directive 95/46/EC was applicable when “the 
processing of  personal data is carried out in the context of  the activities of  an establishment of  the 
controller on the territory of  the Member State (…)”. According to CJEU case-law, a two-step 
test was set out to determine the applicable law under this provision: first, there must 
have been an establishment of  the data controller on the territory of  a Member State 
and, secondly, it was necessary that the “processing of  personal data by the data controller 
be carried out in the context of  the activities” of  that establishment.12 So, one needed to 
clarify what was a data controller (1.1.1), when did it have an establishment (1.1.2) 
and, lastly, when was the processing carried out in the context of  the activities of  that 
establishment (1.1.3.)? 
i. What is a data controller?
According to Article 2 (d) of  Directive 95/46/EC, a data controller was the 
“natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others 
determines the purposes and means of  the processing of  personal data”. 
ii. What is an establishment?
The concept of  establishment was broadly defined in Recital 19: “implies the 
effective and real exercise of  activity through stable arrangements; whereas the legal form of  such an 
establishment, whether simply branch or subsidiary with a legal personality, is not the determining factor 
in this respect”. This means that neither the nationality of  the data controller, the place of  
10 Liane Colonna, “Article 4 of  the EU Data Protection Directive and the irrelevance of  the EU-US 
Safe Harbour Program”, International Data Privacy Law 4(3) (2014): 207.
11 Douwe Korf, “New Challenges to Data protection”, Working Paper No. 2: Data protection laws in 
the EU, European Commission DG JFS, January 2010.
12 Judgment Google Spain, paragraph 50; and Judgment Weltimmo s.r.o. v. Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és 
Információszabadság Hatósag, Case C-230/14, October 2015, paragraph 28 et seq., ECLI:EU:C:2015:639.
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its main establishment or the physical location of  the processing were relevant for EU law 
to apply. Accordingly, EU data protection law might be applicable even if  the main 
establishment was located abroad or in a third country. The paradigmatic Google Spain 
ruling illustrates this situation.  
Despite being extensively debated with respect to the “right to be forgotten”, 
Google Spain is a game changer when we look at the CJEU’s interpretation of  Article 
4(1)(a) of  Directive 95/46/EC.13 In fact, this is the only case where the CJEU was 
required to rule on the applicability of  EU data protection law to a data controller 
with the main establishment in a third country. Google Inc., the parent company of  
the Google Group, which had its seat in the United States and exploited the search 
engine Google Search, was considered the data controller14 and its subsidiary, Google 
Spain, the establishment.15 
In the Weltimmo case, the court advocated a “flexible definition of  the concept of  
‘establishment’”.16 The CJEU found that a data controller is established in a Member 
State when he as a “real and effective activity”, even if  a “minimal one”, which can consist of  
running a real estate website, concerning properties in that Member State and written 
in the language of  that Member State17; secondly, the presence of  a representative 
serving as point of  contact, alongside other elements such as a bank account or a 
post office box, were also highlighted by the CJEU.18 In the Amazon case, the CJEU 
merely clarified that “an establishment cannot exist merely because the undertaking’s website is 
accessible” from a certain Member State”.19
iii. When is the processing carried out in the context of  the activities of  the establishment?
The second moment of  the test applied by the CJEU concerns the condition 
that processing be carried out “in the context of  the activities” of  the establishment. As 
explained by Moerel, the most straightforward example of  this is when a multinational 
company process data centrally outside the EU: “a foreign parent company often also 
processes data of  its EU group companies for central management purposes. If  that processing also 
takes place in the context of  the activities of  these EU group companies (for instance, the foreign 
parent company operates a central HR system both for its own central management purposes, but 
also for HR purposes of  the EU group companies), the EU data protection laws will apply to those 
parts of  the central processing which relates to the respective employees of  the EU subsidiaries”.20 
Recently, the CJEU has, for at least two times, clarified the terms of  this 
condition. The first, and more relevant, was the Google Spain ruling, where the 
court adopted a teleological interpretation of  Article 4 (1) (a) of  Directive 95/46/
EC aiming to ensure “an effective and complete protection of  the fundamental right (…) to 
privacy”.21 In light of  this, the CJEU advocated new criteria to ascertain in which 
13 Merlin Gomann, The new territorial scope…, 569.
14 Considering a search engine a “controller” triggered a lot of  criticism, Christopher Kuner, “The 
Court of  Justice of  the EU Judgment on Data Protection and Internet Search Engines”, LSE Law, 
Society and Economy Working Paper, (2015): 9.
15 Judgment Google Spain, paragraph 48.
16 Judgment Weltimmo, paragraph 29.
17 Judgment Weltimmo, paragraph 32.
18 Judgment Weltimmo, paragraph 33.
19  Judgment Verein fur Konsumenteninformation v. Amazon EU Sàrl, Case C-191/15, July 2016, paragraph 
76, ECLI:EU:C:2016:612.
20 Lukke Moerel, The long arm reach of  EU data protection law…, 30.
21 Judgment Google Spain, paragraphs 53 and 54.
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situations the processing is “carried out in the context of  the activities of  the establishment”: 
when there is an “inextricable link” between the activities of  the EU establishment 
and the processing of  the non-EU data controller.22 In Google Spain, the Court stated 
that, despite the processing of  personal data for the purposes of  the service of  
a search engine (Google Search)23 is carried out exclusively by Google Inc., the 
activities of  Google Spain (promotion and selling of  online advertising space) are 
“inextricably linked” to that processing since “the activities relating to advertising space 
constitute the means of  rendering the search engine at issue economically profitable”.24 Without 
the advertising activities of  Google Spain and similar subsidiaries across the globe, it 
would not be economically feasible for Google to offer its services.  This means that 
the processing performed by Google Inc. is economically sustained by the activities of  
it Spanish establishment. 
But the “inextricable” connection between the processing performed by 
Google Inc. and the activities of  its establishment is not merely economic: it is also 
online.25 When Google Inc. displays personal data on a search results page in Spain, 
that processing “is accompanied, on the same page, by the display of  advertising activity of  the 
controller’s establishment on the territory” of  Spain; hence, for the CJEU, it was “clear” 
that the processing of  personal data by Google Inc. “is carried out in the context of  the 
commercial and advertising activity of  the controller’s establishment on the territory of  a Member 
State”.26
The second decision was the Weltimmo case where it is stated that the CJEU 
significantly diminished the role of  this second moment.27
b. Data controllers not established in the EU
i. Article 4(1)(b)
As stated in this provision, when the data controller is not established in an EU 
Member State, Directive 95/46 was applicable as result of  public international law. 
This provision has a very limited scope: for example, when the data controller is an 
embassy, a ship or a plane located in a third state. It has been stated that “in these 
situations, data protection legislation does not have a truly extraterritorial application, since the 
application of  the law of  a Member State in a third State results from public international law and 
occurs in circumscribed cases”.28
22 Merlin Gomann, The new territorial scope of  EU Data Protection Law…, 572.
23 “In exploring the internet automatically, constantly and systematically in search of  the information 
which is published there, the operator of  a search engine ‘collects’ such data which it subsequently 
‘retrieves’, ‘records’ and ‘organizes’ within the framework of  its indexing programs, ‘stores’ on its servers 
and, as the case may be, ‘discloses’ and ‘makes available’ to its users in the form of  lists of  search results. 
As those operations are referred to expressly and unconditionally in Article 2(b) of  Directive 95/46, 
they must be classified as ‘processing’ within the meaning of  that provision, regardless of  the fact 
that the operator of  the search engine also carries out the same operations in respect of  other types 
of  information and does not distinguish between the latter and the personal data.” – Judgment Google 
Spain, paragraph 28.
24 Judgment Google Spain, paragraph 56.
25 Merlin Gomann, The new territorial scope of  EU Data Protection Law…, 574.
26 Judgment Google Spain, paragraph 55.
27 Merlin Gomann, The new territorial scope of  EU Data Protection Law…, 573.
28 Anabela de Sousa Gonçalves, “The extraterritorial application of  the EU Directive on data 
protection”, Spanish Yearbook of  International Law, 19 (2015): 202.
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 4, No. 2, July 2018
110 Graça Canto Moniz
ii. Article 4(1)(c)
Directive 95/46 was also applicable to the processing of  personal data where the 
“controller is not established on Community territory and, for purposes of  processing personal data 
makes use of  equipment, automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of  the said Member State, 
unless such equipment is used only for the purposes of  transit through the territory of  the Community”. 
The reason for this Article is found in Recital 20: “whereas the fact the processing of  data is 
carried out by a person established in a third country must not stand in the way of  the protection of  
individuals provided for in this Directive; whereas in these cases, the processing should be governed by 
the law of  the Member State in which the means and used are located, and there should be guarantees 
to ensure the rights and obligations provided for in this Directive are respected in practice”.
The notion of  “equipment” [Article 4 (1) (c)] or “means” (Recital 20), crucial to 
determine the applicability of  this provision, was broadly interpreted to entail “personal 
data collection through the computers of  users, as for example in the case of  cookies or JavaScript 
banners”, triggering “the application of  Article 4 (1) (c) to service providers established in third 
countries”.29 Also, according to this broad interpretation, a data controller established 
in a third country that uses equipment in a Member State to process personal data of  
non-EU nationals or residents is bound by Directive 95/46. Since this interpretation 
significantly expands the extraterritorial scope of  EU data protection law, some authors 
questioned whether, in these situations, there was a sufficient connection between the 
foreign activities and the EU and wondered about the EU’s legitimacy to legislate “for 
the world”.30 The CJEU never had the chance to validate this broad understanding of  
Article 4 (1) (c) since the request for a preliminary ruling in the Rease et Wullems case 
was withdrawn.31
Article 4 (1) (c) gained more importance over the years with the development 
of  new technologies and, in particular, of  the Web version 2.0, which facilitates the 
collection and processing of  personal data at a distance and irrespective of  any physical 
presence of  the data controller in the EU.32 The problem, however, was the practical 
and “undesirable” consequences of  applying this provision to data controllers located 
outside the EU in terms of  enforceability and when there was no real connection with 
the EU.33
III. What is new in the GDPR?
In 2010, the European Commission (“EC”) acknowledged the need to build a 
stronger and more coherent data protection framework in the EU, backed by strong 
enforcement that would allow the digital economy to develop across the Internal 
Market, put individuals in control of  their own data and reinforce legal and practical 
certainty for economic operators and public authorities34. In fact, Directive 95/46 was 
29 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law”, 2010: 21.
30 Anabela Gonçalves, The extraterritorial application…, 203; Dan Svantesson, “Extraterritoriality in the 
Context of  Data Privacy Regulation”, Masaryk Journal of  Law and Technology, 7, 1 (2012): 95; Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law”, 29.
31 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (the Netherlands) lodged on 24 April 2015 – 
TD Rease and P Wullems; other party: College bescherming persoonsgegevens.
32 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law”, 19.
33 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law”, 24 and 29.
34 European Commission, “A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European 
Union”, November 2010.
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affected by the “challenge of  regulatory connection”35, “pacing problem”36, and “Collingridge 
dilemma”37, in the sense that the normative solutions prescribed in 1995 were (obviously) 
not adequate in light of  technological and business developments that have brought 
new challenges for the protection of  personal data. Additionally, another drawback 
of  Directive 95/46 concerned the relevant differences between the legislation of  EU 
Member States, making the level of  harmonization deficient.
Two years later, the EC presented a proposal for a regulation that later became the 
GDPR.38 This new framework changed the rules on the territorial scope, especially for 
the case where data controllers are not established in the EU, echoing a proposal from 
the data protection authorities in 2010 pledging for a “more specific connecting factor, taking 
the relevant ‘targeting’ of  individuals into account”.39 Then it was also stated that “such a criterion 
is not new and has been used in other context[s] in the EU, and by the United States legislation (…)”.40 
Two main reasons explain this proposal: the “undesirable” consequences surrounding 
the application of  Article 4 (1) (c) and the tendency that processing operations by 
companies outside the EU increasingly target data subjects for advertising and selling 
products and services online. 
Let us see the exact terms of  this new rule in Article 3 (2) of  the GDPR (2.2.). 
However, before, we must highlight the (small) changes in Article 3 (1) for data 
controllers and processors established in the EU (2.1.). It is worth mentioning that the 
provision concerning the applicability of  the GDPR according to international public 
law, Article 3 (3), remains the same as Article 4 (1) (b) of  Directive 95/46.
a. Data controllers and processors established in the EU 
Article 3(1) of  the GDPR maintains the principle that data protection legislation 
applies if  data is processed in the context of  activities of  an establishment of  a data 
controller on Union territory, while adding, after data controller, “or a data processor”. 
In practice, this means that processors are also directly bound by the GDPR and 
must comply with several impositions such as Article 30 (2) (records of  processing 
activities), Article 31 (cooperation with the supervisory authority), Article 32 (security 
of  processing), Article 33 (2) (notification of  personal data breach), Article 37 
(designation of  the data protection officer) and Article 44 (transfers of  personal data 
to third countries or international organizations).
The GDPR also adds that, when the data controller or processor is established in 
the EU and the processing is in the context of  the activities of  that establishment, it is 
not relevant if  the “processing itself  takes place within the Union”. This aims to clarify that 
it is not necessary that the establishment itself takes part on the processing, as was the 
case in Google Spain.
35 Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution (Oxford: OUP, 2008).
36 Braden Allenby, “Governance and technology systems: the challenge of  emerging technologies”, in 
The growing gap between emerging technologies and legal-ethical oversight, ed. Gary Marchant et al., (Amsterdam: 
Springer, 2011).
37 David Collingridge, The social control technology (s/d: Pinter, 1980).
38 European Commission, “Proposal for a regulation of  the European parliament and of  the Council 
on the protection of  individuals with regard to the processing of  personal data and on the free 
movement of  such data”, COM/2012/011 final - 2012/0011 (COD).
39 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law”, 24.
40 Ibidem.
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b. Data controllers and processors not established in the EU 
According to the English official version, Article 3 (2) states that the GDPR 
“applies to the processing of  personal data of  data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or 
processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering 
of  goods or services, irrespective of  whether a payment of  the data subject is required, to such data 
subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of  their behavior as far as their behavior takes place 
within the Union”. 
Recitals 23 and 24 further explain what the aim of  the EU legislator was. Recital 
23 states that: “In order to ensure that natural persons are not deprived of  the protection to which 
they are entitled under this Regulation, the processing of  personal data of  data subjects who are in the 
Union by a controller or a processor not established in the Union should be subject to this Regulation 
where the processing activities are related to offering goods or services to such data subjects irrespective 
of  whether connected to a payment.” In order to determine whether such a controller or 
processor is offering goods or services to data subjects who are in the Union, it should 
be ascertained whether it is apparent that the controller or processor envisages offering 
services to data subjects in one or more Member States in the Union. Whereas the mere 
accessibility of  the controller’s, processor’s or an intermediary’s website in the Union, 
of  an email address or of  other contact details, or the use of  a language generally used 
in the third country where the controller is established, is insufficient to ascertain such 
intention, factors such as the use of  a language or a currency generally used in one or 
more Member States with the possibility of  ordering goods and services in that other 
language, or the mentioning of  customers or users who are in the Union, may make 
it apparent that the controller envisages offering goods or services to data subjects in 
the Union. Explaining what is meant by monitoring of  the behavior of  data subjects, 
Recital 24 highlights that “to determine whether a processing activity can be considered to monitor 
the behavior of  data subjects, it should be ascertained whether natural persons are tracked on the 
internet including potential subsequent use of  personal data processing techniques which consist of  
profiling a natural person, particularly in order to take decisions concerning her or him or for analyzing 
or predicting her or his personal preferences, behaviors and attitudes.” 
This new geographical scope of  the GDPR is considered by some scholars as 
the most controversial aspect of  the new regulation.41 Nevertheless, in our view, the 
new scope of  application of  the GDPR is reduced when compared with Article 4 
(1) (a) of  Directive 95/46. It is arguable that the data controller established in a third 
country will always have a strong connection to the EU in the sense that he processes 
personal data of  subjects located there and his activities are directed to the EU market, 
its consumers or, generally, “the trading community of  the EU”.42 As stated by Alsenoy, “the 
primary nexus with EU territory is not the presence of  a controller or processor within the EU, but 
rather the location of  the data subjects to which the relevant activities [the offering of  goods or services 
and the monitoring of  behavior] are targeted”.43 De Hert and Czerniawski describe this as a 
“destination approach” and present a strong defense of  Article 3 based on the idea that 
foreign operators will not be surprised by EU Law since they will only be targeted by 
EU law if  they target the EU.44
41 Dan Svantesson, “Extraterritoriality and targeting in EU data privacy law: the weak spot undermining 
the regulation”, International Data Privacy Law 5 (2015): 230.
42 Merlin Gomann, The new territorial scope of  EU Data Protection Law…, 586.
43 Brendan Van Alsenoy, Reconciling the (extra) territorial reach…, 94
44 Paul de Hert and Michal Czerniawski, “Expanding the European data protection scope beyond 
territory: Article 3 of  the General Data Protection Regulation in its wider context”, International Data 
Privacy Law 6 (2016): 231.
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In fact, what is relevant is not the place of  establishment of  the data controller 
but the physical location of  the data subject in the Union, whether domiciled, residing 
or temporarily traveling, whatever their nationality. This is in line with the aim of  the 
former Directive45 and the GDPR to ensure protection to all natural persons, whatever 
their nationality or place of  residence, according to Recitals 2 and 14. Two examples 
illustrate this rule: (1) a national from a Member State provides personal data during 
a holiday in the USA to a data controller established in that country – he/she is not 
protected by the GDPR since he/she is not located in EU territory; (2) a Chinese tourist 
during his/her holiday in Portugal provides his/her personal data to a data controller 
established in a third country that, through its online website, sells its products in the 
EU – he/she is protected by the GDPR since he/she is located in EU territory when 
he/she buys the product. 
Despite the many questions surrounding Article 3 pointed out in the literature46, 
namely the difficulties in enforcing law to a foreign entity with no physical presence in 
the EU, this paper focusses on another issue.
IV. Different wording of  Article 3(2) in official versions of  the 
GDPR
The problem I would like to highlight is only detected when one compares the 
official English version of  the GDPR47 with, for example, the Portuguese and the 
Spanish versions. The main feature of  these two official versions was that in Article 3 
(2), the extraterritorial scope of  the GDPR was different from the English one – and 
so it was until very recently, as we shall see at the end of  this text. According to the 
wording of  those two versions, the GDPR applied to the processing of  personal data 
of  data subjects residing48 in the EU by a data controller or processor not established in 
the EU. This means that, in our example, the Chinese tourist could not benefit from 
the protection afforded by the GDPR since he/she is not a resident in the EU. However, 
if  he/she was buying his/her product in the UK, even in France or Italy, the situation 
would be different.  
In our view, this wording was in clear contradiction with the real intention of  
the EU legislator to protect all data subjects located in the Union despite they not 
being residents in any Member State.49 First, we could state that Article 8 of  the EU 
Charter of  Fundamental Rights (CFREU) is clearly applicable to any individual and 
not only residents in the EU (“Everyone has the right to the protection of  personal 
data concerning him or her”). Nevertheless, one could argue that the condition of  
residency of  the data subject stated in Article 3 (2) of  the Portuguese and Spanish 
versions consists of  a legitimate restriction of  the subjective scope of  the fundamental 
right to data protection if  conditions in Article 52 CFREU are met. This argument 
could hardly be successful since the CJEU has previously stated that EU legislation 
45 Recital 2.
46 Anabela de Sousa Gonçalves, The extraterritorial application…, 208; Brendan Van Alsenoy, Reconciling 
the (extra) territorial reach…, 90; De Hert and Czerniawski, Expanding the European data protection scope…, 
238; Dan Svantesson, Extraterritoriality and targeting in EU data privacy law…, 226; Merlin Gomann, The 
new territorial scope of  EU Data Protection Law…, 584.
47 As well as the Italian and French versions, among others.
48 “Residentes no território da União” (Portuguese version), “interesados que residan en la Unión” (Spanish 
version).
49 Pedro Asensio, “Competencia y Derecho aplicable en el Reglamento General sobre Protección de 
Datos de la Unión Europeu”, Revista española de Derecho internacional 69(1) (2017): 89.
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restricting fundamental rights must lay down “clear and precise rules” governing the “scope 
and application” of  the restriction.50 A restriction of  a fundamental right expressed only 
in some official versions of  the same legal act can hardly be considered “clear and 
precise”.
 Second, the first proposal of  the GDPR by the EC, stating the condition of  
residence of  the data subject, was rejected by the European Parliament51 and there 
is no evidence of  a different position of  the Council. As matter of  fact, the Council 
mentioned, in March 2016, regarding the territorial scope of  the GDPR that “(…) the 
Regulation applies to the processing of  personal data of  data subjects who are in the Union, even if  a 
controller or processor is not established in the Union, but where its processing activities are related to 
the offering of  goods or services to such data subjects in the Union, as well as the monitoring of  their 
behavior as far as their behavior takes place within the European Union”.52 This is in accordance 
with its position regarding Article 3 (2) from April 2016.53
Third, following a systematic reading of  the GDPR, in all official versions, the 
wording of  Recitals 2 and 14 is the same, clearly stating the irrelevance of  the place of  
residence of  the data subject when applying the GDPR. Also, according to Article 3 
(1) of  the GDPR, for example, a citizen or resident in the USA might demand access 
to his data from a data controller with an establishment in the EU when the data is 
processed in the context of  that establishment.54 
V. The unintended consequences of  a linguistic ambivalence
The problem we stress is not merely theoretical. One could say that the practical 
consequences of  the linguistic ambivalence previously noted are irrelevant since they 
are only felt outside the EU. However, if  the EU intends to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, and wants to be taken seriously, it should be more coherent. As stated by 
De Hert and Czerniawski, “when deciding for or against extraterritorial jurisdiction a legislator 
has to assess many factors. The challenge for the EU legislator is to balance flexibility of  the territorial 
scope, required in the digital age for the data protection law to be effective (for example, in order to 
avoid forum shopping), with legal certainty for entities and persons outside the EU processing personal 
data of  individuals in the EU. The stakes for controllers and processors are high: a small American 
50 Judgment Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, Case C-362/14, 6 October 2015, 
paragraph 91, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
51 European Parliament legislative resolution of  12 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of  
the European Parliament and of  the Council on the protection of  individuals with regard to the 
processing of  personal data and on the free movement of  such data, amendment 97.
52 “Draft Statement of  the Council’s Reasons”, Council of  the European Union, 17 March 2016, 7, 
accessed 10 May 2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5419-2016-ADD-1/en/
pdf.
53 “Position of  the Council at first Reading with a view to the adoption of  a Regulation of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council on the protection of  natural persons with regard to the 
processing of  personal data and on the free movement of  such data”, 8 April 2016, 110.
54 This was a question raised during the investigation concerning Cambridge Analytica. The ICO, where 
that data controller is established received a complaint from a US citizen regarding his personal data 
processed in the context of  the activities of  Cambridge Analytica’s establishment in the UK: “(...) 
his data was being processed in the UK by Cambridge Analytica, and the Data Protection Act 1998, 
the GDPR that follows it and the Data Protection Bill do not make distinctions as to citizenship. It 
does not matter that he is a US citizen (…)”. See “Oral Evidence: Fake News”, House of  Commons, 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, last modified 6 March 6, 942, accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/digital-
culture-media-and-sport-committee/fake-news/oral/79824.pdf.
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entrepreneur doing business globally will suddenly be faced with the message that he or she will have to 
comply with EU law in addition to US law”.55 However, if  such linguistic divergence had 
been maintained, a foreign operator not only would have had to comply with the law 
from his/her country of  origin but also with different versions of  EU law and, as we 
will see, different versions of  national law implementing the GDPR. The result is the 
implementation of  a confusing framework from the perspective of  foreign operators 
that might have created loss of  confidence in the (already questioned) legitimacy of  
EU’s exercise of  extraterritorial jurisdiction.
But the consequences of  this linguistic ambivalence are also reflected in the 
literature about Article 3 of  the GDPR and in the national legal acts implementing it. 
First, in the literature, if  there are authors who don’t event tackle this question56, others 
state that the real criterion is the residency of  the data subject in the EU57 which is a 
viewpoint echoed by others.58 Secondly, reflecting the consequences of  this linguist 
variance, the Portuguese governmental proposal implementing the GDPR (“Proposta de 
Lei 120/XII”) originally adopted the condition of  residence as stated in the Portuguese 
official version of  Article 3 (2) of  the GDPR. In fact, Article 2 (2) (b) of  that proposal 
states the “present law is also applicable to the processing occurring outside of  the national territory 
when (…) it affects data subjects residing in the national territory, when the processing activities are 
covered by number 2 of  article 3 of  the GDPR (…)”. Luckily, this wording of  Article 2 
(2) (b) of  “Proposta de Lei 120/XII” was criticized by the Portuguese data protection 
authority59 and is currently being discussed in the Portuguese Parliament.60 
VI. Conclusion: solving the linguistic conundrum of  Article 3 
(2) of  the GDPR
After two years and many academic articles written about Article 3 (2) of  the 
GDPR, the linguistic problem was finally settled. On 19 April 2018, the Council of  the 
European Union adopted a “corrigendum/rectificatif” concerning all linguistic versions.61 
In this document we can find, among other corrections, amendments to Article 3 (2) 
of  the Portuguese and Spanish official versions abolishing the criteria of  residency and 
adopting the same wording of  the English version.62 
From now on, there can be no doubt that, for the GDPR to be applicable, the 
place of  residence of  the data subject in the territory of  the EU is irrelevant. Let us 
hope that the Portuguese legislator reads page 278 of  this “corrigendum”. 
55 De Hert and Czerniawski, Expanding the European data protection scope beyond territory…, 239.
56 De Hert and Czerniawski, Expanding the European data protection scope beyond territory…, 237.
57 Maja Brkan, “The unstoppable expansion of  the EU Fundamental Right to Data Protection”, 
Maastricht Journal of  European and Comparative Law, 23, 5 (2016): 834, “(…) a third-country controller 
processing personal data subjects residing in the Union will have to respect the European data protection standards 
prescribed by the GDPR (…)”.
58 Pedro Asensio, Competencia y Derecho aplicable en el Reglamento General sobre Protección de Datos…, 89. 
59 “Parecer 20/2018”, Comissão Nacional de Proteção de Dados Pessoais, Case 6275/2018: 5v.
60 All information is available at http://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Paginas/
DetalheIniciativa.aspx?BID=42368. 
61 Document number 8088/18, Council of  the European Union, 19 April 2018, accessed 10 May 
2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8088-2018-INIT/en/pdf.
62 For the Spanish version, page 13, and for the Portuguese version, page 278. The corrigendum was 
published in OJ L 127/2, 23.5.2018.
